Abstract. In this paper, we present improved related-key attacks on the original DESX, and DESX+, a variant of the DESX with its preand post-whitening XOR operations replaced with addition modulo 2 64 . Compared to previous results, our attack on DESX has reduced text complexity, while our best attack on DESX+ eliminates the memory requirements at the same processing complexity.
Introduction
Due to the DES' small key length of 56 bits, variants of the DES under multiple encryption have been considered, including double-DES under one or two 56-bit key(s), and triple-DES under two or three 56-bit keys. Another popular variant based on the DES is the DESX [15] , where the basic keylength of single DES is extended to 120 bits by wrapping this DES with two outer pre-and post-whitening keys of 64 bits each. Also, the endorsement of single DES had been officially withdrawn by NIST in the summer of 2004 [19] , due to its insecurity against exhaustive search. Future use of single DES is recommended only as a component of the triple-DES. This makes it more important to study the security of variants of single DES which increase the key length to avoid this attack.
In this paper 3 , we present improved related-key attacks on DESX and DESX+. This work extends the results in [20] . Note that such attacks are applicable to any cryptosystem that uses pre/post-whitening with additional keys, rather than just to DES-based schemes. Previous relatedkey attacks on DESX and DESX+ have been reported in [14] and [20] respectively. We remark here that our results on the DESX variants do not invalidate the security proofs of [15, 16] , but serve to illustrate the limitations of their model. In particular, we argue that one should also consider a more flexible model that incorporates related-key queries [2, 13, 14] .
Our model
Related-key attacks [25, 2, 13, 14] are those where the cryptanalyst is able to obtain the encryptions of plaintexts under both the unknown secret key, K, as well as an unknown related key, K ′ whose relationship to K is known, or can be chosen [25, 2, 13, 14] . Natural generalizations consider several more related keys e.g. 2 2 [3], 2 8 [12] or up to 2 16 [13] . Most relatedkey attacks use related keys with a chosen key difference. For instance, the related-key attacks in [2] require two related keys such that some round key bits match, the recent attack on full SHACAL-1 [4] requires 2 to 2 3 related keys satisfying specific relations on all key bits; the attacks on full KASUMI [4] require 2 2 related keys that differ in only one bit between each related key pair; and the recent [17] best known related-key attacks on AES-192 and AES-256 require 2 6 related keys satisfying strict relationships between them.
The first variant of our attack on DESX in Section 3 uses related keys that differ by some known difference in the pre-or post-whitening key, while the second requires related keys where the pre-or post-whitening keys are negations of each other. While our basic attack on DESX+ in Section 4.1 requires 2 6 related keys with specific chosen bit differences, our more efficient attack in Section 4.2 requires just 2 related keys where the pre-or post-whitening keys are complements of each other.
Some researchers consider related-key attacks as strictly theoretical and which involves a strong and restricted attack model. However, as has been demonstrated by several researchers such as [25, 13, 14, 10, 21, 23] , some of the current real-world cryptographic implementations may allow for practical related-key attacks. Examples of such instances include keyexchange protocols, hash functions and cryptoprocessors, details of which we refer the reader to [25, 13, 14, 10, 21, 23] . In a different direction, the security against related-key attacks has been considered in the theoretical provable security setting [1, 18, 24] as well.
Outline of the paper
We briefly recall previous attacks on DESX and DESX+ in Section 2. In Sections 3 and 4, we present our improved related-key attacks on DESX and DESX+ respectively. We also discuss in Section 5 how to apply our analysis as part of a fault attack. We conclude in Section 6.
Previous Work
We review in this section all previously known attacks on DESX and DESX+.
In the non-related key setting, Daemen [11] presented an attack on DESX that requires 2 32 chosen plaintexts (CP s) and 2 88 single DES encryptions, or 2 known plaintexts (KP s) and 2 120 single DES encryptions; Kilian and Rogaway [15, 16] gave an attack requiring m known plaintexts and 2 118−log 2 m single DES encryptions, i.e. for m = 2 32 , the number of encryptions is approximately 2 113 ; and Biryukov and Wagner [9] gave an attack requiring 2 32.5 known plaintexts, 2 32.5 memory and 2 87.5 single DES encryptions.
Kelsey et. al [14] presented a related-key attack on DESX that requires 2 7 related-key known plaintexts (RK-KPs) and 2 56 single DES encryptions.
Meanwhile, Phan [20] presented two related-key attacks on DESX+ requiring 2 related-key known plaintexts, 2 120 single DES encryptions and no memory, or similar texts, 2 56 single DES encryptions and 2 56 memory. These are the only known attacks on DESX+.
Comparing these previous results, it appears that DESX is stronger than DESX+. Our results in the next few sections will further strengthen this fact.
Related-Key Attacks on DESX
In this section, we will present two variants of improved related-key attacks on DESX. First, we define DESX encryption, denoted by:
where E K (·) denotes DES encryption under key K. Note that DESX is basically single DES encryption with pre-and post-whitening via exclusive-OR (XOR).
The intuition used in our attack is that if we obtain the encryptions of a plaintext P under
to get the ciphertexts C and C ′ respectively, then:
XORing both equations, we obtain:
This is illustrated in Fig. 1 , where Ka denotes XORing with K a . Notice that we started off with the same plaintext, P , and the similarity between the two encryptions remains until just before K b .
Since the Left Hand Side (LHS) of equation (4) is known, and the difference, D between the keys is also known, we can try all possible values of K b and verify if the RHS equals to the LHS. Each verification requires 2 XOR operations and 1 modulo addition, which is negligible. With the correct choice of D, this reduces the keyspace of K b considerably, and so repeating the attack up to 3 times with different plaintexts, P s or key difference, Ds will leave only two possible choices of K b , one of which is the correct key.
In total, we need 3 pairs of related-key known plaintexts (6 RK-KP s), neglibile effort and memory. Once K b is obtained, use it to peel off the last key XOR, and simply do a meet-in-the-middle attack requiring 2 56 single DES encryptions and 2 64 memory. Alternatively, repeat the attack in the reverse direction with related-key known ciphertexts to obtain K a with similar complexities. We are then left with the single DES encryption which can be brute-forced with 2 56 single DES encryptions.
Alternatively, we let (2) and (3):
Trying all possible keys K b and checking for equality with the LHS allows to reduce the keyspace after repeating a few times. With K b recovered, the attack is repeated in reverse to obtain K a . In summary, we can attack DESX with 6× 2 ≈ 2 3.5 related-key known plaintexts/ciphertexts (RK-KP s), and 2 56 single DES encryptions. The amount of required texts is less than Kelsey et. al's attack.
Related-Key Attacks on DESX+
We now discuss two related-key differential attacks on DESX+. First, we define DESX+ as
A Basic Attack
Let ∆K b denote the difference betweeen K b and K ′ b with respect to XOR, X denote the intermediate state just before modulo addition with
denote the ith bit (for i = {0, . . . , 63}), and bit i means the bit that is set in the value 2 i . Our related-key differential attack is as follows:
which denotes a '1' in bit i and 0 elsewhere. 2. Obtain the DESX+ encryption of P under both K = (K a , K, K b ) and
, and denote them as C and C ′ respectively. Refer to Fig. 2 Table 1  (resp. Table 2 ). 
and
Meanwhile, for the cases where
(one has a carry into bit i +1 while the other does not), then we have the following:
and After obtaining K b , repeat the attack (see Fig. 3 ) but in reverse direction to obtain K a with similar complexities. In more detail, this involves 1 ciphertext decrypted under K and under 63 other different K ′ corresponding to ∆K b = e[i] (for i = 0 to 62).
We are then left with the single DES encryption which can be bruteforced with 2 56 single DES encryptions, thus the overall attack complexity is reduced to that of attacking the inner single DES encryption. Fig. 3 . Repeat the attack in reverse i.e. under decryption
Note that although this attack requires more texts than previous results [20] , the gain is the reduction in the number of encryptions and the fact that no memory is required.
A More Efficient Attack
There is a more efficient related-key attack on DESX+. Let's start with an intuition. Consider if we numerically add D to the final key, K b , then the value of the ciphertext, C is numerically increased by D mod 2 n , and similarly if we subtract D from K b we see the same effect on the output ciphertext, C. Now if we complement bit i in K b , then if K b had a 0 the effect on both K b and C is to add 2 i to them, and if the key had a 1 in that bit position the effect is to subtract 2 i . Since the ciphertext, C is known, we can easily determine whether we added or subtracted 2 i , except in the MSB. If the length of the key is k, we can find all its bits (except the MSB) in k −1 complementation tests. By using the decryption process we can similarly determine the first key, K a which is added to the plaintext, and thus reduce the scheme to single DES which can be attacked with an exhaustive key search of 2 56 single DES encryptions.
At first glance, this attack appears to require 63 related-key chosen plaintext queries, and 63 bit comparisons to obtain K b , and similar complexities to obtain K a . However, we can enhance this considerably by simultaneous attacking all bits of K b and find K b by using a single pair! Let C and C ′ be the ciphertexts from encrypting plaintext, P (even an unknown one!) under
This simultaneously adds or subtracts 2 i to each bit position i, and as explained previously, it adds to the ciphertext a known quantity D which is the sum of all the 2 i with signs which are either + or −. In other words, we have:
where
It is easy to show that these sums are all different, and there is a very simple algorithm for recovering all the signs from D. In more detail, it is clear that
Since −K b = (K b + 1) mod 2 n , we have that
By just looking at the difference of C − C ′ , we can determine all but the MSB of K b .
In total, we need only a pair of related-key chosen plaintexts, and one comparison (subtraction) which is negligible.
After obtaining K b , use it to peel off the last key addition, and repeat the attack in reverse direction on the first key addition to obtain K a with similar complexities. We are then left with the single DES encryption which can be brute-forced with 2 56 single DES encryptions.
Consequently, DESX+ is extremely weak against related key attackswith one complementation of the final key, K b you can recover it. Similarly for the first key, K a . And overall the attack complexity reduces to that of attacking the inner single DES encryption.
Applying our Analyses as Part of a Fault Attack
We comment on how to apply our analyses of DESX and DESX+ as part of a fault attack [8] rather than a related-key attack. Fault attacks are considered weaker (and thus more realistic) than related-key differential attacks since the attacker does not choose or know the changed bits in the middle of the encryption, except that they affect a small number of internal bits (a low hamming-weight change vector). If the change affects a few bits at the output of the single DES, we can again see a numeric difference which is the sum of some ±2 i values. Since we do not know which bits are affected, there are in principle 3 n possibilities (each bit position can contribute 0, +2 i , and −2 i to the sum) and a simple counting argument shows that we cannot uniquely identify the case based on the sum mod 2 n . In more detail, we get 3 n possible combinations of 2 0 to 2 n − 1. On the other hand, the biggest possible value is the sum of all these powers, or 2 n − 1, and the smallest possible value is −(2 n − 1) so the range is about 2 n+1 , which is much smaller than the number of possible partial combinations (3 n ). Consequently, many combinations should be equal, and one cannot hope to uniquely determine the combination from the final value. Just to give an example, 2 can be obtained either as (2 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 . . . ) or as (2 2 − 2 1 + 0 + 0 + 0 . . . ). However, if the change pattern has low hamming weight we expect to identify the values in the sum uniquely. Note that if we are allowed to use fault attacks, then Biham and Shamir showed how to use a very small number of faults in the last few rounds of DES to find its key, requiring less than 200 faulty ciphertexts [8] . In our attack we can use the same faults used in [8] , use the fact that they create a small hamming-weight change in the output of DES, and then simultaneously find the pre-and post-whitening keys K a , K b by our technique and the inner DES key K by the BihamShamir attack in [8] . The bottom line is that one needs less than 200 faulty ciphertexts (where a single bit fault is distributed uniformly over all the steps of DESX or DESX+) and negligible additional computation to completely break these schemes (including the extraction of the inner DES key K) by fault analysis.
Concluding Remarks
We have presented improved related-key attacks on both the original DESX and its variant, DESX+. Our results further support the claim in [20] that the DESX+ is weaker than DESX against related-key attacks. We present a comparison of our attacks with previous attacks on DESX and DESX+ in Tables 3 and 4 .
Our related-key attacks exploit the fact that differences between two encryptions are induced halfway in the middle of a cipher due to the difference between two related keys [13] . This is then used to attack that remaining half of the cipher. Our attacks also exploit the noncommutativity between the XOR and modulo addition operations. In particular, the difference operation between two related keys is chosen to be non-commutative to the whitening key mixing operation. This ensures that the difference observed between the corresponding two ciphertexts would be dependent on the key difference. Interestingly, we note as a side remark that the reason differential cryptanalysis [6, 7] works on ciphers is that there exists non-linear components within them. If all components within the ciphers were linear, then differential cryptanalysis would be ineffective against them. This paper
